The latest installment of the India-Pakistan crisis was precipitated by the February 14 terror attack in Pulwama, Indian-controlled Kashmir. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the attack. In an effort to placate domestic pleas for retaliation, and with a general election looming for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India chose to escalate on February 26 with “surgical strikes” on alleged JeM facilities in Balakot, Pakistan. Pakistan responded the next day, downing an Indian Air Force (IAF) jet and captured a pilot during an aerial dogfight over the Line of Control (LoC). In a gesture of de-escalation, Pakistan repatriated the pilot back to India on March 1.
An accurate analysis of the situation has been challenging so far, given various reporting on the events has been rife with competing claims and misinformation. Details such as whether the IAF did in fact cross the LoC into Pakistani territory, whether airstrikes destroyed the JeM facility and left any causalities, and whether a Pakistani F-16 was shot down by Indian MiG-21 jet all remain contested.
Operational complexities aside, the Balakot strikes indicated that New Delhi was willing to apply a punitive counter-terrorism strategy by employing kinetic actions to impose costs on Islamabad. By crossing into Pakistani airspace to carry out an offensive for the first time since 1971, India demonstrated its willingness to engage in both escalation and in conventional response below the nuclear threshold.
During the Balakot crisis, India could have pursued a deterrence strategy in three possible ways. The first was for it to inflict costs on Pakistan and its proxies through punishment by destroying a JeM facility, thus forcing the targeted organizations to rethink their campaign of irregular conflict. One aerial raid was unlikely to impose the necessary costs to deter Pakistan and shift its preferences, however, particularly if the outcome of the strikes were ineffectual, as some open-source evidence suggests.
The second way was by deliberately crossing escalatory thresholds, thereby signaling India’s resolve to punish Pakistan with unpredictable action after years of artillery duels and special-forces raids in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. With Balakot, India escalated both vertically and horizontally; not only with airstrikes, but by bombing targets in undisputed Pakistani territory. In the process it revealed that the Indian military is no longer geographically confined.
The third possible way was by elevating the risk for both sides. The rapid cycle of attack and counter-attack raised the specter of nuclear brinksmanship, which then convinced both sides to de-escalate and revert to LoC skirmishes.
Assuming tensions have peaked, it is crucial to see how these events will shape the escalation dynamics of a future crisis. In the past, India has been highly restrained, electing not to retaliate after successive crises, even after Mumbai attacks in 2008. Its more proactive calculus following the Uri attacks in 2016 and Balakot in 2019 may indicate a new crisis escalation paradox: one where previously viable opt-outs may incentivize India to opt-in to future crises with more military action.
If it becomes overconfident in its ability to manage escalation, India may become seduced by competitive risk-taking and potentially miscalculate Pakistan’s reaction in the course of demonstrating new mobilization processes that intensify risk to unprecedented levels.
